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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
INTERSTATE COM'MERCE REGULATION-POWER TO IMPOSE CON-
DITIONS IN AUTHORIZATION OF SECURITY IssuEs.-The Plaintiff
Railway Company was formed through a reorganization of its
predecessor which had become insolvent. The reorganization plan
provided that the stockholders of the old company might partici-
pate in the reorganization by depositing their common and pre-
ferred stock, together with the sum of $32.00 for each share of
the former and $28.00 for each share of the latter. Each deposi-
tor was to receive stock and, in addition, $28.00 and $24.00, respec-
tively, in bonds of the new company. Out of the remainder of
the money deposited with the reorganization managers, being $4.00
per share, two funds were to be created. A fund equivalent to
$2.50 per share was to be set aside to satisfy such expenses as
cost of foreclosure, court allowances, engraving of securities for
the new company, the corporate trustees' charges; any balance re-
maining to be paid over to the new company. An amount equiva-
lent to $1.50 per share was to be set aside to provide for the com-
pensation of the reorganization managers and the committees, the
fees and disbursements of their counsels and depositaries; any bal-
ance remaining to be paid over to the new company as additional
working capital or to be distributed pro rata to the holders of cer-
tificates of deposit for stock, as the reorganization managers might
see fit. The Interstate Commerce Commission 'authorized the is-
suance of securities by the new company on condition that the spe-
cial funds created through the $4.00 payments by the depositing
stockholders be impounded and not paid out until authorized by the
Commission. The present suit was brought to have this proviso
declared beyond the lawful authority of the Interstate Commerce
Commission and to restrain its enforcement. On appeal to the
Supreme Court, Held, the proviso is valid as to the fund created
by the payment of $2.50 per share but is invalid as to the fund cre-
ated by the payment, of $1.50 per share. The United States and
Commission v. Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul, and Pacific Railroad
Company, 51 Sup. Ct. 159 (1931).
Under the provisions of section 20A of the Transportation
Act, the Commission is empowered to make its grant of authority
to issue securities upon such conditions as it may see fit.' However,
the power to impose conditions must be exercised in conformity
with the constitutional grant of authority to regulate interstate com-
merce-the condition must relate to commerce.2
In the view of the majority of the Court, the fund created
by a $2.50 payment was within the "realm of commerce." As to
the fund created by the $1.50 payment, however, the majority of
1 "The Commission shall have power by its order to grant or deny the
application as made. * * *, or to grant it with such modifications and upon
such terms and conditions as the Commission may deem necessary or appro-
priate." Ch. 91, Sec. 439, 41 Stat. 494; U. S. C. A., Tit. 49, Sec. 20A. Subd. 3.
'Union Bridge Co. v. United States. 204 U. S. 364, 384-385; 27 Sup Ct.
367 (1906); Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U. S. 251, 38 Sup. Ct. 529 (1917).
RECENT DECISIONS
the Court was of the opinion that it represented private property
and was outside the "realm of commerce" because "whether the
carrier would receive any part of it was a matter of speculation,
being wholly dependent upon the unrestricted will of its custodians"
-the reorganization managers.
The minority of the Court took the view that, in determining
whether the transaction pertained to commerce, the practical opera-
tion of the plan should control rather than the formal interests of
the respective parties. Applying this test to the contract governing
the fund created by the payment of $1.50 per share, the Commis-
sion was acting within its powers for, in substance, the payments
into this fund were part of the necessary price exacted for the new
securities. The dissenting opinion points out that reorganizations
of excessive cost militate against the stability of the credit of the
transportation system in that the attractiveness of railroad securities
as investments is impaired. Moreover, reorganization costs may
play a part in determining the going concern value of a railroad
company as an element of rate making 3 and, hence, the public at
large has a direct interest in the matter.
Stability of credit is essential to the preservation of the trans-
portation system to which end the Transportation Act, under which
the Commission derives its powers to regulate security issues, was
enacted.4 Regulation of fees and costs charged by bankers and
financiers who generally dominate reorganizations, should not be
permitted to be defeated by the simple expedient of having expenses
paid out by the managers for the account of the carrier rather than
payment being made directly by the carrier. The majority opinion
is not in harmony with the broad purpose of the legislative enactment.
E. P. W.
PLEADING AND PRACTICE-JOINDER OF PARTIES DEFENDANT-
CIVIL PRACTICE ACT, SEC. 193, SUBD. 2, CONsTRuED.-Plaintiff, an
employee of a car-cleaning company, was injured by shunting cars
belonging to the defendant railroad company but upon land leased
by it to the employer. Defendant now seeks to have the employing
company brought in as party defendant under a contract by which
said employer agrees to indemnify the railroad for all injuries to
person or property occurring upon land leased from the railroad.
The trial Court denied defendant's motion for joinder. On appeal,
Held, reversed. Hejza v. New York Central R. R. Co., 137 Misc.
824, 246 N. Y. Supp. 34 (1930).
'See McCardle v. Indianapolis Water Company, 272 U. S. 400, 414, 47
Sup. Ct. 140 (1926); United Railways v. West, 280 U. S. 234, 50 Sup. Ct.
123 (1930).
'New England Divisions Case. 261 U. S. 184, 189, 43 Sup. Ct. 270 (1922);
Dayton, Goose Creek Ry. Co. v. United States, 263 U. S. 456, 478, 44 Sup.
Ct. 169 (1923).
